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(iii) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
pursuant to a request of the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, Mary 
T. Noonan, the Plaintiff, John Wagner Associates dba Grabber Utah, 
respectfully submits this Response to Defendant Hercules' Petition for 
Rehearing. In accordance with the instructions from the Clerk of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff is responding only to Sections 
II. B. and II.D. of Hercules' Petition. The Clerk specifically 
instructed the Plaintiff not to address the arguments made by the 
Defendant in Sections II.A. and II.C. of Defendant's Petition for 
Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
The standard for reviewing Hercules' Petition for Rehearing is 
stated in Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Rule 
states, in pertinent part, "The petition shall state with particular-
ity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court 
has overlooked or misapprehended . . . ." Section II.B. of Hercules' 
Petition, fails to set forth any law or facts which the Court over-
looked or misapprehended. And, while Section II.D. of Hercules' 
Petition does state a valid point of law that the Court misapprehend-
ed, there is additional law upon which the Court may grant an award of 
attorneys' fees to the Plaintiff for Hercules' failure to obtain a 
payment bond, as set forth more fully below. 
Although Section II.B. of Hercules' Petition fails to meet the 
standard for the Court's review, each of the two Sections of Hercules' 
Petition for which a response has been requested by the Court is 
addressed in the subsections below. 
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I. THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PURCHASE ORDER BETWEEN HERCULES 
AND MODULAIRE CONSTITUTED A CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
MODULAR OFFICE UNITS. 
In Section II.B. of the Petition, Hercules assails the Court's 
decision that, as a matter of law, the purchase order between Hercules 
and Modulaire for the procurement of the office buildings constituted 
a contract for the construction of those buildings. Hercules' attack 
on the Court's holding is twofold, neither of which warrants a 
rehearing or a change in the Court's Opinion of August 31, 1990. 
First, Hercules claims that the Court was in error since the 
Plaintiff did not contract directly with Hercules. And second, 
Hercules criticizes the Court's reliance upon a factual stipulation 
concerning the contractual relationships on the project, which 
stipulation was entered voluntarily by Hercules at the trial of the 
case. The contentions asserted by Hercules with respect to the this 
issue are completely groundless. The Court has not overlooked or 
misapprehended any facts or law with respect to the Court's holding 
that the purchase order constituted a contract for the construction of 
the office buildings. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff addresses the two 
contentions of Hercules below. 
With respect to the first contention, Hercules attempts to 
mislead the Court by fabricating a statutory requirement that the 
Plaintiff must have contracted directly with Hercules in order for 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq. to apply. On page 6 of the 
Petition, Hercules erroneously states that "Hercules, therefore, did 
not contract with Wagner for the construction of the units, as 
required by the Payment Bond Statute." While it is true that the 
Plaintiff did not contract with Hercules, no such statutory 
requirement exists in the Payment Bond Statute. 
2 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) states 
that: 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a con-
tract , involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, 
addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure or improvement upon land shall, before any 
such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a 
bond in the sum equal to the contract price, with good 
and sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful 
performance of the contract and the prompt payment for 
material furnished, equipment and materials rented, and 
labor performed under the contract. 
Emphasis added. Section 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1965) goes on to 
state, in pertinent part, that: 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, 
or to exhibit the same, as required herein, shall be 
personally liable to all persons who have furnished 
materials or performed labor under the contract. . . . 
Emphasis added. 
From a reading of these Sections, it is clear that contract 
privity is not required for a person to make a claim under Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq., either on a bond, if one is provided, or 
against the owner personally, if a bond is not provided. In fact, 
these statutes, and the personal liability of the property owner 
mandated therein, were created specifically to eliminate lack of 
privity defenses when an owner receives the benefit of labor or 
materials provided to improve the owner's property but fails to 
require a bond to assure payment thereof. 
The Defendant also assails the Court's reliance upon the stipula-
tion of the contractual chain for the procurement of the modular 
office complexes. However, Hercules fails to point out in its 
Petition that the Court did not rely solely on the stipulation to 
arrive at the legal conclusion that the purchase order constituted a 
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contract for the construction of the office buildings. The Court 
arrived at the same conclusion by analyzing the facts of the case and 
the provisions of the purchase order itself. The stipulation, 
combined with the facts of the case, present overwhelming proof that 
the purchase order between Hercules and Modulaire constituted a 
contract for the construction of the office buildings. 
The stipulation, as well as the evidence submitted at the trial 
and the representations of the Defendant's own attorney at the oral 
argument before this Court, clearly establish the following: 
1. Hercules entered into a purchase order with Modulaire for 
the procurement of approximately 25,000 square feet of 
office space which was to be constructed using modular units 
for the shell of two seperate buildings, the construction of 
which extended to finishing, altering and improving the 
shells to specifications required by Hercules for completed 
office buildings. 
2. Under the purchase order, Modulaire owed a duty to Hercules 
to provide the office buildings within a time certain and 
according to specifications which were issued, approved 
and/or required by Hercules. 
3. In order to meet its obligations under the purchase order, 
Modulaire contracted with Space Building Systems for the 
construction of the interior of the office buildings. 
4. In order for Space Building Systems to meet its obligations 
under its construction contract with Modulaire, and 
derivatively for Modulaire to meet its obligations to 
Hercules under the purchase order, Space Building Systems 
contracted with the Plaintiff to provide materials for the 
construction of the interior of the office buildings. 
5. The materials supplied by the Plaintiff were in fact used in 
the construction of the office buildings. 
6. Hercules did not require a payment bond from Modulaire to 
assure the payment of the labor and materials required to 
construct the office buildings as required by Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985). 
For the Defendant to argue that the purchase order between 
Modulaire and Hercules was not for the construction of the office 
buildings not only disregards the plain language of the statute but it 
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ignores the facts that the Court has already thoroughly reviewed in 
arriving at its decision. Further, Hercules has failed to identify 
even one fact or state one element of law which the Court has 
overlooked or misapprehended. 
Hercules' contentions simply defy common sense. If the purchase 
order was not one for construction of the office buildings, how was 
Modulaire supposed to fulfill its contractual obligations to Hercules? 
Were the office complexes supposed to materialize out of thin air 
without any effort to purchase, assemble and erect the various 
materials and components into finished buildings? It defies logic for 
there to be any conclusion other than the purchase order was indeed a 
contract for the construction of the office buildings. 
In its opinion, this Court properly drew from the stipulation and 
from the facts of the case to hold that, as a matter of law, the 
purchase order was for the construction of the office buildings. The 
fact that Hercules now wishes that it had not entered into the 
stipulation should be of no consequence to the Court. This is 
especially true since there is ample evidence in the record that the 
stipulation accurately reflects the contractual relationships among 
the contracting entities. 
The Court, in the text of Footnote 4 on pages 6 and 7 of the 
August 31, 1990 Opinion, correctly states that even aside from 
stipulation entered voluntarily by Hercules, the evidence in the 
record leads to the conclusion that the purchase order constituted a 
contract for the construction of the office buildings. It is sound 
reasoning which led the Court to state generally: 
If a lessee enters into an agreement to lease a 
building which is not currently on its land but will be 
constructed by the lessor, the lessee is necessarily 
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entering into a contract to construct the building upon 
its land or the land in which it has an interest. 
Even more compelling are the facts of this case where the buildings 
were constructed by a contractor which is not the lessor. 
Hercules has an interest in the land which predates the purchase 
order contract between Hercules and Modulaire for the procurement of 
the office buildings. Hercules entered into a purchase order for 
procurement of the office buildings upon the land in which it has an 
interest. In order for Modulaire to fulfil its obligations to 
Hercules under the purchase order, it had to construct the office 
buildings. Therefore, the purchase order is necessarily a contract 
for the construction of the office buildings. No other conclusion is 
possible under the facts of this case. 
The facts of the case are largely undisputed and the Court cited 
some of those facts to show several indicators that the purchase order 
was a contract for the construction of the office buildings. In 
Footnote 4, pp. 6 and 7 of the August 31, 1990 Opinion, the Court 
stated: 
Even absent the parties' stipulation, the leasing 
arrangement constitutes a contract for the construction 
of a building on its own merits. The purchase order by 
which Hercules leased the complexes from Modulaire 
states: "These complexes will be built to Hercules 
specification no. 9106." The purchase order also states 
"Installation to be complete as soon as possible. 
Hercules will be responsible for site preparation, 
sewer, water and electrical service hookups." The 
purchase order also provided for one time charges for 
"delivery, set-up and skirting" of the complexes which 
were to be billed separately from the monthly lease 
payments. The construction contract between Modulaire 
and SBS similarly refers to Hercules as the "Owner" and 
Modulaire as the "Contractor." 
Emphasis in original. 
While these are the facts that the Court cited, there are many 
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others in the record which further support the conclusion made by the 
Court. 
II. WHILE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 14-2-3 (1953 AS ENACTED IN 1963) DOES 
NOT PROVIDE FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES IN AN ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 
OBTAIN A PAYMENT BOND, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 14-2-2(3) (1953 AS 
AMENDED IN 1989) APPLIES TO PENDING LITIGATION AND ENTITLES THE 
PLAINTIFF TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IN THIS ACTION FOR 
FAILURE TO OBTAIN A PAYMENT BOND. 
Hercules correctly states the status of the law with respect to 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-3 (1953 as enacted in 1963). However, that 
does not mean that the Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of 
attorneysf fees. 
In 1986, the Utah legislature amended § 14-2-3 and then repealed 
it in 1987. Then in 1989, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code 
Annotated § 14-2-2 to specifically include provisions for attorneys' 
fees in claims for failure to obtain a payment bond. Section 14-2-
2(3) (1953 as amended in 1989) states: 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs 
in the action. 
There is persuasive authority which leads to the conclusion that 
an award of attorneys' fees in this action is appropriate under § 14-
2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) even though the amendment was made 
during the pendency of this case. 
The starting point in the analysis is to set forth the general 
rule. Generally, the substantive law which is in effect at the time 
a cause of action accrues is the law which should apply to any suit to 
enforce the cause of action. See, Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial 
Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986). This general rule is well 
founded in common law (See, Farrel v. Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 P. 843 
(1888) (predecessor statute was merely a statement of well-settled 
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rules of statutory construction)) and in statutory law (See, Utah Code 
Annotated § 68-3-3). See also, In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
However, since the statute governing this general rule is merely 
a statement of well-settled rules of statutory construction, it is 
subject to the common law exceptions to such rule. 
There are several exceptions to the general rule upon which Utah 
and other courts have applied intervening statutory amendments to 
pending litigation. These are: (1) when the statutory amendment 
affects only procedural law rather than substantive rights (State 
Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) and 
Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983)); (2) when the amendment is remedial (Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985)); (3) when the amendment is meant 
to clarify and amplify existing law (State Department of Social 
Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) and Okland Construction 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)); (4) when the 
amendment does not enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested or contractual 
rights (State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 
(Utah 1982) and Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1985)); and (5) when the statutory amendment specifically states that 
it is to apply retroactively (Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3). 
The exceptions to the general rule are as well-settled as the 
general rule. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "Even in states 
where the state constitution prohibits retroactive application of 
statutes, an exception is made for remedial procedural statutes." 
Pilcher v. State, Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455 
(Utah 1983). The Utah cases cited above have applied statutory 
amendments retroactively, or have at least recognized that such 
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application is appropriate. This is so regardless of the general rule 
stated in Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3. There can be no question that 
the common law exceptions to the general rule which are noted above 
apply to Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A contrary rule applies, however, where a statute 
changes only procedural law by providing a different 
mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights. Such remedial statutes are generally applied 
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to 
further the Legislature's remedial purpose. 
Pilcher, 663 P.2d at 455. The Utah Supreme Court also stated: 
[P]rocedural statutes enacted subsequent to the 
initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, 
or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only 
to future actions, but also to accrued and pending 
actions as well. 
State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982). 
This Court must determine whether the intervening amendment of 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 to allow a discretionary award of 
attorneys1 fees fits into one of the common law exceptions to the 
general rule and, therefore, should be applied to this case to allow 
the Plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees under Utah Code Annotated § 
14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989). The Court must determine whether 
the intervening amendment of § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) does 
not "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights" of 
the parties hereto. If it does not, Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 
(1953 as amended in 1989) should be applied to this case and the 
Plaintiff should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees as costs. 
Such an award is in the discretion of the Court. 
To the best of the Plaintiff's knowledge, the Utah appellate 
courts, have never addressed the issue of whether an intervening 
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statutory amendment authorizing an award of attorneys' fees fits into 
one of the stated exceptions. The Plaintiff is also unaware of any 
Utah trial court decisions regarding this issue. However, there are 
other states' appellate courts which have directly addressed the 
issue. 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that an intervening 
statutory amendment authorizing attorneys' fees was procedural or 
remedial in nature. That Court stated: 
Statutes generally operate prospectively unless 
remedial in nature. A statute is remedial when it 
relates to practice, procedure or remedies and does not 
affect substantive or vested rights. We deem 
attorney's fees to be remedial in nature and therefore 
give the statute retroactive effect. 
Camer v. Seattle School District No. 1, 52 Wash.App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 
(1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also, Bradfute v. 
Renton School District No. 403, 19 Wash.App. 638, 577 P.2d 157, 159 
n.l (1978). 
The Supreme Court of California also held that an intervening 
statutory amendment authorizing attorneys' fees would apply to cases 
pending on appeal. In Woodland Hills v. City Counsel of Los Angeles, 
154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200, 206 (1979) stated: 
The section provides explicit statutory authorization 
for a "private attorney general" attorney fee award. . 
. . Although section 1021.5 was not on the books at 
the time the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for 
attorney fees, the governing authorities establish that 
the new statute nonetheless applies to this proceeding, 
which was pending on appeal at the time the legislative 
enactment became effective. 
Emphasis added. The California Court went on to cite substantial 
Federal case authority for the proposition that intervening statutory 
amendments authorizing awards of attorneys' fees apply to cases 
pending on appeal at the time of the effective date of the amendment. 
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See,, e.g., Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Gore 
v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977; Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 
1033 (4th Cir. 1977); and Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2nd Cir. 
1976). 
Other state courts have held that where a statutory amendment 
grants the court authority to award discretionary attorneys1 fees, as 
opposed to a mandatory award of attorneys' fees, such amendments would 
be applied to pending actions. Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as 
amended in 1989) grants such discretionary authority to the courts to 
award attorneys' fees and tax them as costs in the action. 
In Circle K Corporation v. Rosenthal, 118 Ariz. 63, 574 P.2d 856 
(1978), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a permissive statutory 
amendment which became effective during the pendency of the appeal was 
to be applied to the case on appeal. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied an intervening statutory 
amendment allowing an award of attorneys' fees to a pending case. In 
Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276, 1277-1278 (1978), the 
Court stated: 
The application of I.e. § 12-121 to a claim for relief 
which arose prior to the enactment of that section but 
tried after the section became law is not an improper 
retroactive application of that section since we view 
its provision as remedial and procedure and not as 
affecting the substantive claim for relief. 
Eir hasis added. See also, Ericksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho 
693, 778 P.2d 815 (Idaho App. 1989) (attorneys' fees amendment applied 
retroactively since either party could recover att' neys' fees if it 
were the successful party). 
Another Idaho case further emphasizes the point. In Meyers v. 
Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (Idaho App. 1988), while the 
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Court declined to allow and award of attorneys' fees because it 
required a mandatory award rather than a discretionary award, the 
Court stated: 
Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or 
destroy contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be 
remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive. . . 
When this classification scheme is applied to 
statutes authorizing discretionary awards of attorney 
fees, such statutes generally are held to be remedial 
or procedural. Consequently, they are given 
retroactive effect. Presumably, any amendment to such 
statutes would receive retrospective effect. 
Emphasis in original. Citations omitted. 
These cases are helpful and persuasive in deciding the case at 
bar. Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) states 
that "the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party." This grant of discretionary authority does not enlarge, 
create or diminish vested or contractual rights of the parties. The 
ability of the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys' fees 
does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. The cause of 
action upon which the Plaintiff seeks recovery remains the same and 
Hercules is still liable for failure to obtain a payment bond. 
Section 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) further states that 
"These fees shall be taxed as costs in the action." Thus, the award 
of attorneys' fees under this Section is not substantive right of the 
parties but rather an extension of the Court's undisputed authority to 
procedurally award "costs" in an action or appeal. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the amendment of Utah 
Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) to allow the 
discretionary award of attorneys' fees is a procedural provision which 
is remedial in nature and should be applied to this case to grant the 
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Plaintiff an award of its reasonable attorneys' fees herein.1 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Court did not overlook or misapprehend any 
facts or law with regard to the issue of whether the purchase order 
between Modulaire and Hercules for the procurement of the office 
buildings constituted a contract for the construction of the 
buildings. The Court's decision on this issue was based upon two 
rationales. 
First, the stipulation regarding the contractual relationships 
among Hercules, Modulaire, Space Building Systems and the Plaintiff 
was enough to resolve the issue by itself. Second, the Court looked 
to the undisputed facts of the case and the language of the purchase 
order to independently arrive at the conclusion that the purchase 
order constituted a contract for the construction of the office 
buildings. 
Hercules complains of only the Court's usage of the stipulation 
but says nothing about the facts cited by the Court or about the 
necessary inferences drawn from those facts (as stated by the Court in 
the second and third paragraphs of Footnote 4 on p. 7 of the Opinion). 
1
 Although the Court's ruling to reinstate the Plaintiff's 
mechanic's lien foreclosure cause of action opens the door for 
recover of attorneys' fees under Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-18, 
such an award may only be recoverable from the amounts generated 
from a foreclosure sale, if the mechanic's lien is ultimately 
ordered to be foreclosed. At this juncture, the only sure method 
for the Plaintiff to recover it attorneys' fees from Hercules is to 
hold Hercules liable for such fees under Utah Code Annotated § 14-
2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989). As the Court appropriately noted in 
its opinion of August 31, 1990 at page 5, Hercules had its remedy 
in its own hands (quoting language from Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 122, 127, 167 P.2d 241, 244, 246 (1917). If 
Hercules had done what the law requires and obtained a payment bond 
from Modulaire, Hercules would have no liability under Utah Code 
Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. and the Plaintiff likely would have been 
paid, including its attorneys' fees if it had to sue on the bond. 
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Hercules fails to state any facts which the Court overlooked or 
misapprehended. Further, Hercules does not cite any statutory or case 
authority which the Court overlooked or misapprehended. Even if the 
Court were to disregard the stipulation, the facts mandate the same 
conclusion. 
Hercules does attempt to mislead the Court into believing that 
the Plaintiff must have privity of contract with Hercules for Utah 
Code Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq. to apply. Such is not the case. 
While Hercules may have "always maintained that it is nothing more 
than a lessee of the mobile trailers" (Petition for Rehearing at p. 
7), that does not change the fact that the stipulation, the facts 
presented at the trial and the language of the purchase order all 
dictate that Hercules did in fact contract for the construction of the 
office buildings. As the Court correctly stated, "Inherent in such a 
lease is a contract for the construction of the building itself or 
else the lease agreement would be void and of no effect." Opinion at 
p. 7, Footnote 4. 
Further, the award of attorneys fees is within the discretion of 
the Court, albeit under Utah Code Annotated §14-2-2 (1953 as amended 
in 1989) rather than under Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-3. The 
amendment to § 14-2-2 granting the Court power to award the prevailing 
party a discretionary award of attorneys' fees is a procedural and 
remedial amendment which may be applied to accrued and pending 
actions, even actions pending on appeal. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the Court deny Hercules' Petition for Rehearing on all 
issues except for a statement by the Court clarifying that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees from Hercules 
14 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) 
rather than under Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-3 as stated in the 
Opinion of August 31, 1990. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J£±_ day of October, 1990. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Darrel J. Bostwick 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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